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STATE REGULATORY EFFORTS IN PROTECTING A
SURROGATE’S BODILY AUTONOMY
Alexus Williams*
I. INTRODUCTION
The field of infertility and assisted reproductive technology (ART)1 has
made incredible strides throughout the last forty years. Starting with the first
human born by in vitro fertilization (IVF) in 1978,2 researchers of fertility
treatment have made relentless efforts in adapting ART technology to meet
numerous couples’ unique needs.3 Just recently, in December 2017, the
United States welcomed the first live birth of a baby to a woman who had a
uterine transplant.4 Due to these major, innovative developments in ART,
countless individuals throughout the world have actualized their dreams of
starting a family.5 According to the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention’s (CDC) 2016 Fertility Clinic Success Rates Report, there were
263,577 ART cycles performed,6 resulting in 65,996 live born infants in that
year alone.7 “Today, approximately 1.7% of all infants born in the United
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1
ART is defined as “[a]ll treatments or procedures that include the handling of human
eggs or embryos to help a woman become pregnant.” 2015 Assisted Reproductive Technology
Fertility Clinic Success Rates Report, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION 531
(2017), ftp.cdc.gov/pub/Publications/art/ART-2015-Clinic-Report-Full.pdf.
2
S. Shivaji, The Journey of R. G. Edwards: From a Single Cell to Louise Joy Brown,
100 CURRENT SCI. 488, 488 (2011). On July 25, 1978, Louise Joy Brown became the first
human to have been born after conception by IVF. Id.
3
See ART Success Rates, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/art/artdata/index.html (last visited Sept. 2, 2018).
4
Madison Park, Baby Is First to Be Born in US After Uterus Transplant, Hospital Says,
CNN (Dec. 4, 2017, 4:54 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/12/04/health/uterus-transplantus-baby-birth/index.html.
5
See ART Success Rates, supra note 3.
6
“ART cycles include any process in which (1) an ART procedure is performed, (2) a
woman has undergone ovarian stimulation or monitoring with the intent of having an ART
procedure, or (3) frozen embryos have been thawed with the intent of transferring them to a
woman.” 2015 Assisted Reproductive Technology Fertility Clinic Success Rates Report,
supra note 1.
7
ART Success Rates, supra note 3.
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States every year are conceived using ART.”8
Advancements in reproductive biotechnology have created
complicated legal, ethical, and moral dilemmas.9 Among the myriad of
fertility services, including hormonal therapy, artificial insemination, and
gamete/zygote intrafallopian transfer, one of the most controversial methods
of “reproduction has grown at an even greater rate than ART generally: the
use of surrogate mothers.”10 This emerging area of reproductive technology
has led to many surrogacy-related disputes.
Despite the growing prevalence and availability of commercial
surrogacy arrangements,11 the law of surrogate motherhood in the United
States is currently in a state of confusion.12 In the United States, surrogacy
is governed by a hodgepodge of contradictory state laws; some enforce
surrogacy contracts, some ban them entirely, and some allow them under
certain circumstances.13 Many states, however, do not have any laws
regarding surrogacy contracts.14 The patchwork of legislation pertaining to
surrogacy in the United States reflects the various ethical and practical
concerns associated with this reproductive practice.
There were numerous challenges to the legality of surrogacy when it
first came into use.15 But now, as the practice has become more common,
the legal issues have become more complex.16 Among the various problems
pertaining to this form of ART, the surrogate’s decision-making authority is
perhaps the most perplexing. In 2015, a forty-seven-year-old California
woman named Melissa Cook executed a gestational surrogacy contract with
the intended parent and genetic father, known in the court filings as C.M.17
8

Id.
See infra Part II. Discussion of this broad domain is well beyond the purview of this
Comment, but it should be noted that the issues include topics such as the rights of fetuses,
donors, and adoptive parents; the liability of physicians; patentable organisms; and other new
developments in research.
10
Magdalina Gugucheva, Surrogacy in America, COUNCIL FOR RESPONSIBLE GENETICS,
3 (2010), www.councilforresponsiblegenetics.org/pagedocuments/kaevej0a1m.pdf; see
BRETTE MCWHORTER SEMBER, THE COMPLETE ADOPTION & FERTILITY LEGAL GUIDE 197 (1st
ed. 2004). The number of gestational surrogate cycles increased from 2,251 in 2006 to 4,725
in 2015 (a 110% increase), while the number of ART cycles performed only increased from
138,198 in 2006 to 182,154 in 2015 (a 32% increase). 2015 Assisted Reproductive
Technology National Summary Report, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION 50, 53
(2017), https://www.cdc.gov/art/pdf/2015-report/ART-2015-National-Summary-Report.pdf.
11
See infra Part II.B.
12
Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-807 (2013), with LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:286
(2016).
13
See infra Part IV.
14
See infra Part IV.
15
See infra Part II.A.
16
See infra Part II; see also infra Part III.
17
Cook v. Harding, 190 F. Supp. 3d 921, 928 (C.D. Cal. 2016), aff’d, 879 F.3d 1035 (9th
9
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The surrogacy agreement spanned seventy-five pages and included a
selective reduction clause, in which one or more of the fetuses in a multiple
pregnancy could be terminated.18 Because of Cook’s advanced age, the
doctor implanted three male embryos into her uterus to increase the chances
that at least one would prove viable.19 In this case, all embryos survived.20
Fearful that he would not be able to afford triplets, C.M. attempted to invoke
the agreement’s selective reduction clause, asking Cook to reduce the
pregnancy by one fetus.21 Cook, however, refused to do so, “citing her antiabortion beliefs.”22 The three babies were ultimately born and a hotly
contested legal battle over parentage and the constitutionality of the
California Parentage Act ensued between Cook and C.M.23 As Cook v.
Harding24 illustrates, one of the issues plaguing surrogacy contracts is the
question of decision-making. In fact, it stresses the need for heightened
clarity in limiting which autonomous rights a surrogate can waive in a
surrogacy agreement.
This Comment will analyze how different states regulate surrogacy
issues. Specifically, it will examine how these issues are regulated to protect
a surrogate’s bodily autonomy. Part II of this Comment will examine the
history of surrogacy. Next, Part III will discuss issues involving disputes
about critical decision-making roles between the surrogate and the intended
parents. Part IV will detail the current surrogacy regulatory schemes among
the states. Finally, Part V will provide solutions wherever gaps or variations
exist, and present a balancing test that can be implemented by the courts to
determine the limitations of provisions that divest the surrogate of her
autonomous, decision-making rights. This Comment will ultimately argue
that legislation should impose ample restrictions on specific rights that
cannot be contracted away, such as the right to an abortion, as well as provide

Cir. 2018).
18
Id. at 928−29.
19
Id. at 928.
20
Id.
21
Id. at 928–29.
22
Id.
23
See Cook, 190 F. Supp. 3d at 925. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the
Appellate Division of the Superior Court’s judgment enforcing the gestational surrogacy
contract between Cook and C.M. C.M. v. M.C., 213 Cal. Rptr. 3d 351 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017).
The judgment cut off Cook’s parental rights to the three children in accordance with CAL.
FAM. CODE § 7962. Id. at 354. Meanwhile, as the state proceeding continued, Cook filed a
complaint against C.M. in the United States District Court for the Central District of
California. Cook, 190 F. Supp. 3d at 926. The court held that the state judicial system
provided an adequate outlet to seek relief, and therefore, dismissed the claim. Id. at 938. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s order. Cook
v. Harding, 879 F.3d 1035, 1043 (9th Cir. 2018).
24
190 F. Supp. 3d 921 (C.D. Cal. 2016), aff’d, 879 F.3d 1035 (9th Cir. 2018).
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the courts with a sufficient legal framework.25
II. THE HISTORY OF SURROGACY AND ITS EVOLUTION
Surrogacy is a form of ART commonly utilized by couples who desire
to start families of their own, but otherwise lack the ability to do so.26 The
rapid pace of advancements in reproductive technology has given infertile
couples, same-sex couples, and single individuals ways to build a family
through surrogacy.27 Surrogacy is defined as “[t]he process of carrying and
delivering a child for another person.”28 The term “commercial surrogacy”
is defined as “a contractual relationship where compensation is paid to a
surrogate and agency . . . in exchange for the surrogate’s gestational
services.”29 Although the term is new,30 the idea of surrogacy has been
practiced for years—even tracing back to biblical times.31
Commercial surrogacy implicates the bodily integrity of the surrogate
and the rights of the intended parents to contract freely.32 This ultimately
creates a tension between allowing the intended parents to make intrusive
decisions for the surrogate mother, and ensuring that the surrogacy contract
does not divest the surrogate of all autonomous, decision-making rights.33
Before discussing the appropriate solution for this matter of contention, it is
imperative to first explore the history and evolution of surrogacy.

25
Because the Legislature cannot imagine every scenario in which the surrogate’s
autonomous decision-making rights could be compromised by a surrogacy agreement, the
balancing test will provide the judiciary with guidance during disputes of first impression.
26
What is Surrogacy?, CIRCLE SURROGACY, https://www.circlesurrogacy.com/pages/
what-is-surrogacy (last visited July 17, 2018).
27
See infra Part II.B.
28
Surrogacy, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
29
Katherine Drabiak et al., Ethics, Law, and Commercial Surrogacy: A Call for
Uniformity, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 300, 301 (2007).
30
Modern surrogacy, as it is known today, has only been practiced for the last three
decades. About Surrogacy: From the Bible to Today: The History of Surrogacy,
SURROGATE.COM,
https://surrogate.com/about-surrogacy/surrogacy-101/history-ofsurrogacy/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2018). It was not until 1980 that the first commercial
surrogacy agreement was arranged between a traditional surrogate and the intended parents.
Id. Soon after, in 1985, the first successful gestational surrogacy was completed. Id. These
historic developments paved the way for the contemporary notion of surrogacy. Id.
31
In the Bible, when Sarah, Rachel, and Leah were infertile, they gave their
handmaids—Hagar, Bilhah, and Zilpah—to have babies for their husbands. Genesis 16:1–4,
15; 30:1–10.
32
See Katherine B. Lieber, Selling the Womb: Can the Feminist Critique of Surrogacy
Be Answered?, 68 IND. L.J. 205, 226–27 (1992).
33
See Alayna Ohs, The Power of Pregnancy: Examining Constitutional Rights in a
Gestational Surrogacy Contract, 29 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 339, 355–56 (2002).
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A. The Two Different Types of Surrogacy Arrangements
There are two types of surrogacy arrangements: traditional surrogacy
and gestational surrogacy.34 Traditional surrogacy was the first of the two
procedures to be medically possible.35 It is defined as “[a] pregnancy in
which a woman provides her own egg, which is fertilized by artificial
insemination, and carries the fetus and gives birth to a child for another
person.”36 Because this earlier type of surrogacy uses the surrogate’s own
egg, a biological relationship is created with the child, which makes a
stronger case for courts to determine that the birth mother is also the legal
mother.37 Such reasoning led to decisions such as the Baby M case, bringing
widespread attention to the procedure and possible legal complications that
traditional surrogacy can entail.38
In 1986, surrogacy encountered its first significant legal challenge in
perhaps the most famous case in surrogacy history, the Baby M case,39
involving a traditional surrogacy arrangement. The facts of the case “riveted
the attention of much of the country in the late 1980s” and exemplified why
traditional surrogacy arrangements have since been avoided.40 The case
arose from a contract entered into by William Stern and Mary Beth
Whitehead in February 1985.41 Mr. Stern and his wife, Elizabeth Stern,

34
See Jennifer S. White, Gestational Surrogacy Contracts in Tennessee: Freedom of
Contract Concerns & Feminist Principles in the Balance, 2 BELMONT L. REV. 269, 274
(2015); see also RICKIE SOLINGER, REPRODUCTIVE POLITICS: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO
KNOW 108 (2013). Surrogacy can take many forms, including: (1) a traditional surrogate
mother who is both genetically related as well as carrying a child who has genetics from an
intended father; (2) a traditional surrogate who uses donor sperm but is giving the child up to
a different intended father and intended mother; (3) a gestational mother who has genetics
from two donors but has two intended parents who will not be biologically related to the child;
(4) a surrogate serving as a gestational mother who is impregnated with an intended parent’s
sperm and an intended parent’s eggs; and (5) a gestational mother using genetics from one
intended parent with help from a donor. See Darra L. Hofman, “Mama’s Baby, Daddy’s
Maybe:” A State-By-State Survey of Surrogacy Laws and Their Disparate Gender Impact, 35
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 449, 451 (2009).
35
See About Surrogacy: From the Bible to Today: The History of Surrogacy, supra note
30.
36
Traditional Surrogacy, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
37
See Elizabeth S. Scott, Surrogacy and the Politics of Commodification, 72 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 121−22 (2009); see also In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
38
In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1227; see also In re Baby, 447 S.W.3d 807 (Tenn. 2014);
Doe v. Doe, 710 A.2d 1297 (Conn. 1998); A.L.S. ex rel. J.P. v. E.A.G., No. A10-443, 2010
WL 4181449 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 26, 2010).
39
In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1227; About Surrogacy: From the Bible to Today: The
History of Surrogacy, supra note 30.
40
MARY LYNDON SHANLEY, MAKING BABIES, MAKING FAMILIES: WHAT MATTERS MOST
IN AN AGE OF REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES, SURROGACY, ADOPTION, AND SAME-SEX AND
UNWED PARENTS 102 (2002).
41
In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1235.
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hoped to have children and start a family of their own.42 Mrs. Stern feared
that this, however, was beyond the bounds of possibility due to her multiple
sclerosis, which made pregnancy dangerous and potentially life
threatening.43 At first the Sterns considered adoption but became
discouraged at the delays involved.44 As an alternative, the couple decided
to use surrogacy.45
Mr. Stern and Whitehead subsequently entered into a surrogacy
contract in which Whitehead agreed to be artificially inseminated by Mr.
Stern’s sperm and to carry the child for the couple.46 The contract contained
terms indicating that Whitehead would surrender the child and, in return,
would receive a $10,000 fee.47 The insemination was successful; Whitehead
became pregnant and gave birth to a baby girl in March 1986.48
After turning the baby over to the Sterns, Whitehead began to
experience emotional difficulty.49 The next day, she begged the Sterns to let
her temporarily take the baby, promising to return with her later.50 Fearful
that in her state of distress Whitehead might harm herself, the Sterns allowed
her to take the child.51 The next week, however, Whitehead called the Sterns
and informed them that she had changed her mind and would not relinquish
the baby.52 The Sterns proceeded to sue Whitehead in New Jersey state
court, seeking enforcement of the surrogacy contract.53 After the judge
entered an order requiring her to relinquish custody, Whitehead fled to
Florida with Baby M.54 It was not until the end of July that Florida police
invaded Whitehead’s home, forcibly removed the baby, and delivered the
child back to the Sterns.55

42

Id.
Id.
44
Id. at 1236. The Sterns declined to adopt for two additional reasons: (1) Mr. Stern
desired his genetics to live on, particularly because most of his family had been lost in the
Holocaust, and (2) the Sterns saw a potential problem arising from their age and their differing
religious backgrounds. Id.
45
Id.
46
Id. at 1235.
47
In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1235.
48
Id. at 1236. Whitehead called the baby Sara; the Sterns called the baby Melissa. Id.
49
Id.
50
Id. at 1237.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1237.
54
Id.
55
Id.
43
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When the Sterns regained possession of the child, the trial court
reaffirmed the prior order requiring Whitehead to relinquish custody.56 The
trial court held that the contract, by which Whitehead had agreed to bear the
child for the Sterns, was valid and that Mr. Stern was the legal parent.57
Whitehead appealed, and the Supreme Court of New Jersey granted direct
certification.58 The Supreme Court of New Jersey invalidated the surrogacy
contract on public policy grounds,59 holding the intended payment to be
illegal60 and potentially degrading to women.61 The Court then used the legal
standard of “the best interests of the child” for custody purposes, and
determined that custody should be awarded to the Sterns.62
In traditional surrogacy arrangements, like the contract entered into by
Whitehead and Mr. Stern, the surrogate, whose egg is fertilized, is the true
biological mother of the child, which makes a stronger case that she also has
parental rights to the child.63 In these scenarios, to officially establish the
intended parents as the child’s legal parents, the surrogate’s parental rights
need to be terminated, and the genetically-unrelated intended parent needs
to complete a stepparent adoption.64 Because of these additional legal
complications, many surrogacy professionals stopped offering traditional
surrogacy programs and instead moved toward the use of gestational
surrogacy programs.65

56

Id.
Id. at 1237–38. The trial court based a major part of its decision upon the view that
custody with the Sterns was in the child’s best interests. Id. at 1237. The highly-publicized
trial “entail[ed] six weeks of testimony and half a million dollars of legal bills.” MARTHA A.
FIELD, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: THE LEGAL AND HUMAN ISSUES 4 (1990).
58
In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1238.
59
Id. at 1246–49. Specifically, the court found that surrogacy contracts were void
because they violated policies concerning the consent of the surrogate to surrender the child.
Id. According to the court’s reasoning, “the natural mother is irrevocably committed before
she knows the strength of her bond with her child. She never makes a totally voluntary,
informed decision.” Id. at 1248.
60
Id. at 1240–42.
61
Id. at 1249 (“On reflection . . . it appears that the essential evil is . . . taking advantage
of a woman’s circumstances . . . in order to take away her child.”).
62
Id. at 1256, 1260–61. The Court remanded the case to the trial court for determination
on visitation. Id. at 1261. On remand, the trial court found that it was in the child’s best
interest to have an ongoing relationship with Whitehead and, therefore, granted her
“unsupervised, uninterrupted, liberal visitation” with Baby M. In re Baby M, 542 A.2d 52,
53 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1988).
63
See Scott, supra note 37, at 121–22.
64
Intended Parents: Establishing Parentage in Surrogacy, SURROGATE.COM,
https://www.surrogate.com/intended-parents/surrogacy-laws-and-legalinformation/establishing-parentage-in-surrogacy (last visited Feb. 10, 2018).
65
See Carol Sanger, Developing Markets in Baby-Making: In the Matter of Baby M, 30
HARV. J.L. & GENDER. 68, 79 (2007) (indicating that ninety-five percent of surrogacy
arrangements are gestational).
57
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Gestational surrogacy differs from traditional surrogacy in that the
former is a “pregnancy in which one woman (the genetic mother) provides
the egg, which is fertilized, and another woman (the surrogate mother)
carries the fetus and gives birth to the child.”66 Because the surrogate does
not provide the egg, she is not biologically related to the child.67 Therefore,
it is less burdensome for courts to determine that the surrogate has no
parental rights to the child.68 This, in effect, simplifies parentage issues and
makes gestational surrogacy less legally complicated than traditional
surrogacy.69 Gestational surrogacy proves to be more attractive to the parties
and more palatable to lawmakers and the public.70 Over the last three
decades,71 this type of surrogacy experienced an expanding growth in
popularity, which can be attributed to cases such as Johnson v. Calvert.72
Five years after the Baby M decision, the enforceability of a commercial
surrogacy contract was again litigated in Johnson v. Calvert.73 By contrast,
however, the dispute focused on gestational surrogacy.74 In 1990, Anna
Johnson contracted with Mark and Crispina Calvert, agreeing to be
implanted with an embryo created from Mr. Calvert’s sperm and Mrs.
Calvert’s egg and to gestate the fetus to term.75 The contract stipulated the
Calverts as the legal parents and required Johnson to relinquish all parental
rights in exchange for three payments totaling $10,000.76 In the months
succeeding Johnson’s in vitro fertilization, however, the relations between
66

Gestational Surrogacy, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
Gestational
Carrier
or
Surrogacy,
REPRODUCTIVEFACTS.ORG,
https://www.reproductivefacts.org/topics/topics-index/gestational-carrier-or-surrogacy (last
visited Feb. 10, 2018).
68
Brittnay M. McMahon, The Science Behind Surrogacy: Why New York Should Rethink
Its Surrogacy Contracts Laws, 21 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 359, 363 (2011).
69
See Scott, supra note 37.
70
See infra text accompanying notes 73–85.
71
About Surrogacy: From the Bible to Today: The History of Surrogacy, supra note 30.
72
851 P.2d 776 (1993); see also Gestational Surrogacy or Traditional Surrogacy? That
is
the
Question,
SURROGACY
PARENTING
SERVS.
(Dec.
9,
2014),
http://surrogateparenting.com/gestational-surrogacy-traditional-surrogacy-question; see also
Scott, supra note 37, at 122.
73
In addition to Baby M, Johnson is considered another landmark surrogacy case that
yields particular importance in the United States. See J. HERBIE DIFONZO & RUTH C. STERN,
INTIMATE ASSOCIATIONS: THE LAW AND CULTURE OF AMERICAN FAMILIES 96 (2013).
Although the Johnson decision generated little controversy, “the case had a profound impact
on surrogacy practice.” Scott, supra note 37, at 122. Gestational surrogacy promptly became
the preferred arrangement. Id.
74
Johnson, 851 P.2d at 777–78.
75
Id. at 778. Mark and Crispina Calvert had desired to have children but were unable to
because Mrs. Calvert had undergone a hysterectomy, where her uterus was removed. Id. “Her
ovaries remained capable of producing eggs, however, and the couple eventually considered
surrogacy.” Id.
76
Id.
67
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the parties soured.77 Johnson demanded the full balance of her payments,
threatening to refuse to relinquish the child unless the Calverts complied.78
The Calverts responded with a lawsuit to determine the parentage of the
child.79
The Supreme Court of California resolved the dilemma by looking at
the intent of the parties in signing the contract.80 The court determined that
when both gestation and genetic ties “do not coincide in one woman, she
who intended to procreate the child—that is, she who intended to bring about
the birth of a child that she intended to raise as her own—is the natural
mother.”81 The court found intent to be the primary determinant of
parentage, reasoning that the child would not have been born but for the
intention of the Calverts.82 The Supreme Court of California found the case
to be distinguishable from the Baby M case because Anna Johnson, unlike
Mary Beth Whitehead, had no genetic relationship to the child.83 The court
emphasized the importance of the biological connection between the
pregnant woman and the fetus in determining parentage.84 The court
ultimately concluded that the Calverts were the genetic parents, that Johnson
had no parental rights, and that the contract was legal and enforceable.85
The difference between gestational and traditional surrogacy
arrangements is an important legal distinction, central to determining the
legal status of those involved. In the case of traditional surrogacy, it is clear
that the surrogate is the biological mother of the child and, as such, has a
claim to parental rights to the child.86 In the case of gestational surrogacy,
however, the surrogate is in no way biologically related to the child and

77

Id. The relationship between the parties deteriorated after “Mark learned that Anna
had not disclosed she had [previously] suffered several stillbirths and miscarriages.” Id.
Additionally, the Calverts had agreed to buy a $200,000 life insurance policy on Johnson’s
life, but failed to do. Id.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Johnson, 851 P.2d at 783.
81
Id. at 782.
82
Id. at 783. A number of cases following Johnson have relied on the rule of intent to
resolve surrogacy disputes. Perri Koll, The Use of the Intent Doctrine to Expand the Right of
Intended Homosexual Male Parents in Surrogacy Custody Disputes, 18 CARDOZO J.L. &
GENDER 199, 200 (2012). For further discussion of the “intent doctrine,” see id. at 201
(demonstrating “why courts should follow the Johnson v. Calvert approach in solving
surrogacy disputes by awarding custody to the intended parents”).
83
See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782; see also id. at 789 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
84
See id. at 782.
85
Id. at 778, 787. Courts in additional cases applied similar reasoning. See J.F. v. D.B.,
879 N.E.2d 740 (Ohio 2007); J.F. v. D.B., 897 A.2d 1261 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006); Nolan v.
Labree, 52 A.3d 923 (Me. 2012).
86
Scott, supra note 37.
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therefore has no parental rights to said child.87 Hence, commercial surrogacy
arrangements are typically limited to gestational surrogacy because it is less
legally complicated—that is, it efficiently offers legal certainty about the
parental status of all parties to the surrogacy arrangement—than traditional
surrogacy.88
B. Trends and Reproductive Outcomes That Have Led to the Growth
of Surrogacy over the Years
The cost of gestational surrogacy arrangements can run from $60,000
to $150,000 when medical and legal expenses are included.89 Despite these
high costs, however, the practice of gestational surrogacy is growing
rapidly.90 Due to advancing medical knowledge and techniques, commercial
surrogacy now serves the desires of couples struggling with infertility issues,
as well as single individuals and same-sex couples looking to start a family
of their own.91 Although there is no formal collection of statistics tracking
surrogate births in the United States, estimates suggest that gestational
surrogate births nearly doubled from 2004 to 2008, reaching approximately
1,400 births annually.92 The CDC’s statistics indicate that between 1999 and
2013, gestational carrier cycles resulted in 13,380 deliveries and the births
of 18,400 infants—half of which were twins, triplets, or higher-order
multiples.93 “In 2011, the Society of Assisted Reproductive Technology
(SART) tracked 1,593 babies born in the United States to gestational
surrogates . . . up from 1,353 in 2009, and just 738 in 2004.”94
87

McMahon, supra note 68, at 363.
For additional commentary on how the expansion of gestational surrogacy has been
an important factor in changing the way people view surrogacy arrangements, see Scott, supra
note 37.
89
See Intended Parents: How Much Does Surrogacy Cost?, SURROGATE.COM,
https://surrogate.com/intended-parents/the-surrogacy-process/how-much-does-surrogacycost/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2018); see also Understanding Costs, GROWING GENERATIONS,
https://www.growinggenerations.com/surrogacy-program/intended-parents/surrogacy-cost/
(last visited Feb. 10, 2018).
90
SOLINGER, supra note 34, at 108.
91
See FIELD, supra note 57, at 37; see also SHANLEY, supra note 40, at 106.
92
Gugucheva, supra note 10, at 4, 11–12. Currently, there are only two sources of
statistics on gestational surrogacy. Id. at 6. Both the CDC and SART collect and report data
on the success rates per ART cycle carried out in fertility clinics nationally. See 2015 Assisted
Reproductive Technology Fertility Clinic Success Rates Report, supra note 1. Each clinic is
required to report whether it offers services to patients using gestational surrogates and what
percentage of IVF cycles were performed on surrogates. Id. Small and new clinics are exempt
from CDC reporting, and not all IVF clinics are members of SART. Id. Therefore, it is likely
that both data sets are under-inclusive.
93
ART and Gestational Carriers, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/art/key-findings/gestational-carriers.html (last visited April 10, 2018).
94
Deborah L. Cohen, Surrogate Pregnancies on Rise Despite Cost Hurdles, THOMSON
REUTERS (Mar. 18, 2013, 5:41 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-parent88
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The appeal to couples struggling with infertility issues has been an
important factor in the growing prevalence of gestational surrogacy.95
Commercial surrogacy arrangements allow infertile individuals who cannot
bear children to assume the responsibilities of parenthood.96 According to
the CDC, about 12.1% of women (6.7 million) in the United States aged
fifteen to forty-five have difficulty getting pregnant or staying pregnant and
about 9.4% (5.8 million) of men in the United States aged fifteen to fortyfive have some form of infertility or nonsurgical sterility.97 Many infertile
couples view gestational surrogacy as an appealing alternative to adoption.98
Individuals struggling with infertility issues prefer to use gestational
surrogacy rather than adoption because of their desire to create children
genetically related to their family.99
Another factor attributing to the growing prevalence of gestational
surrogacy is an individual’s inability to conceive based on circumstantial
limitations—for example, single individuals preferring to raise a child alone,
or same-sex couples seeking parenthood.100 Persons in these situations are
unable to give birth to a child without the assistance of reproductive
technology.101 Therefore, with the emergence of gestational surrogacy,
single individuals and same-sex couples can pursue parenthood in ways that,
until now, were not possible.102 As a viable option for conception without
engaging in intercourse, gestational surrogacy provides single individuals
and couples in same-sex relationships the opportunity to develop their own
nuclear family, while still retaining a genetic relationship with their
children.103
surrogate/surrogate-pregnancies-on-rise-despite-cost-hurdles-idUSB
RE92H11Q20130318.
95
See SHANLEY, supra note 40, at 106.
96
Id.
97
Anjani Chandra et al., Infertility and Impaired Fecundity in the United States, 1982–
2010: Data from the National Survey of Family Growth, 67 NAT’L HEALTH STATS. REPS. 1, 6
(2013).
98
See DIFONZO & STERN, supra note 73, at 68. Adoption is a lengthy process that can
take one to two years to complete. See id. (“[T]he adoption process could be costly, risky,
and subject to disruption.”). Often, couples struggling with infertility issues choose surrogacy
after years of failed fertility treatments or difficulty finding a child to adopt. See ZARA
GRISWOLD, SURROGACY WAS THE WAY: TWENTY INTENDED MOTHERS TELL THEIR STORIES
138 (2006).
99
See Koll, supra note 82, at 202.
100
See DIFONZO & STERN, supra note 73, at 72; see also SEMBER, supra note 10, at 160–
61.
101
See SEMBER, supra note 10, at 160–61.
102
DEAN A. MURPHY, GAY MEN PURSUING PARENTHOOD THROUGH SURROGACY:
RECONFIGURING KINSHIP 22 (2015).
103
See DEBORA L. SPAR, THE BABY BUSINESS: HOW MONEY, SCIENCE, AND POLITICS
DRIVE THE COMMERCE OF CONCEPTION 69–96 (2006) (discussing the historical evolution of
surrogacy); see also Erica Davis, Note, The Rise of Gestational Surrogacy and the Pressing
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Same-sex male couples, in contrast to same-sex female couples,
however, have no other option than gestational surrogacy if they wish to have
a biological connection to their child.104 Although there is no formal tracking
on the number of same-sex male couples having babies through the means
of gestational surrogacy, observers say that the numbers are growing.105 An
unofficial study conducted by Fertility IQ on behalf of the Chicago Tribune
suggests that more same-sex male couples in the United States are turning to
surrogacy than in previous years.106 The study, involving data from fertility
clinics in ten different cities, found that “10 to 20 percent of donor eggs are
going to gay men having babies via [gestational] surrogacy, and in a lot of
places the numbers are up to 50 percent from five years ago.”107 Gestational
surrogacy is seen as an appealing option for same-sex male couples seeking
to have children with some of their own genetic material rather than
adopting.108
The decision to enter into a commercial surrogacy arrangement is not
an easy decision for prospective parents; however, couples struggling with
infertility issues, single individuals, and same-sex couples are willing to go
through various medical procedures, sign a variety of legal documents, and
pay significant sums of money simply to experience the joy of having
Need for International Regulation, 21 MINN. J. INT’L L. 120, 122 (2012).
104
See Koll, supra note 82, at 202; see also Wendy Norton, Nicky Hudson & Lorraine
Culley, Gay Men Seeking Surrogacy to Achieve Parenthood, 27 REPROD. BIOMEDICINE
ONLINE 271, 272–73 (2013), https://ac.els-cdn.com/S1472648313001806/1-s2.0S1472648313001806-main.pdf?_tid=c180b25c-a126-4623-8a65ae0b3daee604&acdnat=1538670459_e4985e106e0819d12a32477cce1af1d3 (“Gay men
wishing to become fathers are limited by biological possibilities and therefore always require
a ‘facilitating other.’”). The number one reason same-sex male couples chose surrogacy is to
have a biological connection to their children. Arlene Istar Lev, Commentary, Gay Dads:
Choosing Surrogacy, 7 LESBIAN & GAY PSYCHOL. REV. 72, 74 (2006) (“Scott, who is
partnered with Eduardo and the father of 18-month-old twins . . . says, ‘We wanted the
biological connection with a child.’”).
105
See, e.g., DAVID STRAH, GAY DADS: A CELEBRATION OF FATHERHOOD 56–57 (2003);
Nara Schoenberg, Gay Men Increasingly Turn to Surrogates to Have Babies, CHI. TRIB. (Nov.
23, 2016, 8:59 AM), www.chicagotribune.com/lifestyles/health/sc-gay-men-having-babieshealth-1130-20161123-story.html.
106
Schoenberg, supra note 105.
107
Id.
108
See Koll, supra note 82, at 202. With the growing prevalence of commercial
surrogacy, it should be noted that same-sex couples may look outside of the United States for
arrangements but should be cognizant of the potential limitations. For example, in India and
Russia, same-sex marriages are strictly prohibited—in fact, they are punishable by
incarceration. Evie Jeang, Reviewing the Legal Issues that Affect Surrogacy for Same-Sex
Couples, L.A. LAW., Jul.–Aug. 2016, at 12. The increased practice of same-sex male
surrogacy in India ultimately led to a same-sex surrogacy ban, which contributed to the
country imposing a national commercial surrogacy ban. See Izabela Jargilo, Regulating the
Trade of Commercial Surrogacy in India, 15 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 337, 345 (2016). Therefore,
same-sex couples may not have an option to enter commercial surrogacy arrangements
everywhere internationally.

WILLIAMS (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

11/3/2018 12:45 PM

COMMENT

217

biologically-related children.109 As the availability of commercial surrogacy
arrangements continues to grow, individuals are becoming increasingly more
aware of its potential as a viable option to obtain parenthood.110
C. Feminist Legal Theory: Surrogacy Through the Lenses of Various
Schools of Feminism
It was through the Baby M case that commercial surrogacy was first
scrutinized as an issue of social, political, and legal interest.111 Not only did
the case garner national attention, but it also produced a feminist split on the
issue of surrogacy.112 At the time of the proceedings, a group of well-known
feminists joined with the Foundation on Economic Trends to file an amicus
curiae brief in the case.113 The brief argued that the commercialization of
surrogate parenthood violated the dignity of women.114 In response to this
critique, however, other feminists argued that commercial surrogacy ensured
women’s right to self-determination.115 Even the New Jersey Chapter of the
National Organization for Women (NOW)116 failed to reach a consensus on
109

See supra text accompanying notes 89–99.
An increasing number of high-profile celebrities have also helped contribute to the
popularity of couples choosing to use commercial surrogacy to start a family. See Lindsay
Tigar,
19
Celebrities
Who
Used
Surrogates,
MEREDITH
CORP.,
https://www.parents.com/parenting/celebrity-parents/moms-dads/celebrities-who-usedsurrogates/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2018); see also Melody Chiu & Jen Juneau, Kim Kardashian
and Kanye West Expecting Baby No. 3 via Surrogate!, PEOPLE (Sept. 6, 2017, 11:29 AM),
https://people.com/parents/kanye-west-kim-kardashian-expecting-third-child-surrogatepregnant/. With the help of celebrities showing a positive side to surrogacy, many people
have been inspired to start families of their own using this method of reproduction. The
Celebrity Influence on Surrogacy, CONCEIVEABILITIES (Nov. 16, 2016),
https://www.conceiveabilities.com/about/blog/the-celebrity-influence-on-surrogacy.
Celebrities have been influential in surrogacy becoming widely accepted, generating a larger
discussion about the “modern family.” Id.
111
See supra Part II.A.
112
RUTH MACKLIN, SURROGATES AND OTHER MOTHERS: THE DEBATES OVER ASSISTED
REPRODUCTION 60 (1994).
113
MARY BRIODY MAHOWALD, WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN HEALTH CARE: AN UNEQUAL
MAJORITY 108 n.56 (1993) (citing Brief for the Foundation of Economic Trends et al. as
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, In re Baby M, 109 N.J. 396 (1988) (No. FM-2531486E)). The feminists joining the brief included Betty Friedan, Gloria Steinem, Gena Corea,
Barbara Katz Rothman, Lois Gould, Michelle Harrison, Kathleen Lahey, Phyllis Chesler, and
Letty Cottin Pogrebin. Id.; see Elizabeth Mehren, Feminists Fight Court Ruling in Baby M
Decision: Steinem, Friedan, Chesler, French Among Supporters, L.A. TIMES (July 31, 1987),
http://articles.latimes.com/1987-07-31/news/vw-147_1_gloria-steinem; see also Joseph F.
Sullivan, Brief by Feminists Opposes Surrogate Parenthood, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 1987, at
B3.
114
Sullivan, supra note 113.
115
See Iver Peterson, Baby M Trial Splits Ranks of Feminists, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 1987,
at B1.
116
NOW is the largest organization of feminist activities in the United States. Who We
Are, NAT’L ORG. FOR WOMEN, https://now.org/about/who-we-are/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2018).
110
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the issue.117 The head of the chapter was reported to have said: “We do
believe that women ought to control their own bodies, and we don’t want to
play big brother or big sister and tell them what to do . . . . But on the other
hand, we don’t want to see the day when women are turned into breeding
machines.”118
After the Baby M case, the division among the various feminist schools
of thought on commercial surrogacy continued to be a topic of contention.119
Today, while some feminist scholars and commentators view commercial
surrogacy in a positive light—as a technology that gives women the ability
to make use of their reproductive capacity—other feminists argue that
surrogacy is an exploitative tool that undermines bodily autonomy and
integrity.120 One commonality among the varying feminist viewpoints on
this issue, however, is that the intended parents should not have an unfettered
right to control or limit the surrogate’s behavior during the pregnancy by
provisions in a surrogacy contract.121 The majority of feminists are in
agreement that the underlying purpose of the feminist movement is to allow
women more control over their reproductive choices.122 It is important to
explore the arguments in favor of commercial surrogacy as well as the
arguments against commercial surrogacy in order to find an appropriate
solution.
On one hand, feminist proponents of commercial surrogacy argue that
it gives women more reproductive options, thus granting women control over
the biological processes that have historically defined them.123 In their view,
the key idea is freedom of choice.124 For example, Hugh V. McLachlan
Since its founding in 1966, NOW’s goal has been to take action to bring about equality for all
women. Id.
117
MACKLIN, supra note 112.
118
Id.
119
ALEX FINKELSTEIN ET AL., COLUMBIA LAW SCH. SEXUALITY & GENDER LAW CLINIC,
SURROGACY LAW AND POLICY IN THE U.S.: A NATIONAL CONVERSATION INFORMED BY
GLOBAL LAWMAKING 32–37, 52 (2016).
120
Id. Feminist scholars in favor of surrogacy argue that the right to enter into
commercial surrogacy arrangements is a natural extension of the right to personal autonomy.
Liezl van Zyl & Anton van Niekerk, Interpretations, Perspectives and Intentions in Surrogate
Motherhood, 26 J. MED. ETHICS 404, 404 (2000). Other feminists, in contrast, view
commercial surrogacy as a contractually regulated pregnancy that restricts the surrogate to
terms and conditions binding over her body, constraining her bodily autonomy and bodily
integrity. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 246–
48 (1989).
121
MACKLIN, supra note 112.
122
See Norma Juliet Wikler, Society’s Response to the New Reproductive Technologies:
The Feminist Perspectives, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 1043, 1051 (1986); see infra Part III.A for an
extensive analysis on well-established reproductive rights.
123
RONIT IRSHAI, FERTILITY AND JEWISH LAW: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON ORTHODOX
RESPONSA LITERATURE 151–52 (Joel A. Linsider trans., 2012).
124
Id.
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argues that prohibiting “mothers from making . . . particulate interpretations
of their pregnanc[ies]” would violate their right to autonomy, ultimately
reinforcing the negative stereotype of women as incapable of full, rational
agency.125 And on the other hand, feminists that oppose commercial
surrogacy view it as a form of slavery or prostitution in which the surrogate
is exploited and controlled through her reproductive capacities.126 Many
believe that it is a form of oppression that divests the surrogate of all
autonomous, decision-making rights.127
Feminists arguing against
commercial surrogacy focus on the concept of control and free choice.128
From this perspective, commercial surrogacy is “a process meant to control
women and their procreative powers for the benefit of men.”129 Therefore,
in formulating the appropriate solution, one should keep in mind that the
middle ground between these two viewpoints is the encouragement of the
surrogate’s freedom of choice—which is to say, the majority of feminists
agree that the intended parents should not have an unfettered right to control
or limit a surrogate’s behavior.
III. THE COMPOSITION OF A STANDARD SURROGACY CONTRACT
Commercial surrogacy arrangements are anomalous in that they
involve one or more persons contracting for the provision of labor that
implicates the bodily integrity of a third party.130 Contractual provisions in
the commercial surrogacy agreement regulate the surrogate’s conduct during
pregnancy.131 Each contract will be slightly different, but generally
speaking, a standard surrogacy agreement imposes obligations on the
surrogate “to visit the doctor, to eat healthy, and to refrain from consuming
substances such as drugs, alcohol, and cigarettes that could harm the
developing fetus.”132 Because the potential life engenders some degree of
125
Hugh V. McLachlan, Defending Commercial Surrogate Motherhood Against Van
Niekerk and Van Zyl, 23 J. MED. ETHICS 344, 346 (1997). McLachlan is a professor of applied
philosophy at the School of Law and Social Sciences at Glasgow Caledonian University. Id.
at 348.
126
See MACKINNON, supra note 120. For an expansive comparison of commercial
surrogacy and prostitution, see ANDREA DWORKIN, RIGHT-WING WOMEN 181–82 (1983).
Andrea Dworkin offers the most radical and scathing formulation of the critique by offering
two models to describe how women are socially controlled and sexually exploited: the brothel
and the farm. Id. The brothel model relates to prostitution, and the farm model relates to
women as a class planted with the male seed and then harvested. Id.
127
Lieber, supra note 32, at 205–06.
128
Id.
129
IRSHAI, supra note 123, at 207.
130
Lieber, supra note 32, at 212–13, 226–27.
131
Id. For a sample gestational surrogacy contract, see Sample Gestational Surrogacy
Contract,
SURROGATE
MOTHERS
ONLINE,
www.surromomsonline.com/articles/gscontract.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2018).
132
FIELD, supra note 57, at 66; see infra Part III.B.
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social concern, these provisions appear to have reasonable restrictions;
however, issues arise when these provisions divest the surrogate of all
autonomous, decision-making rights.133 For example, most commercial
surrogacy contracts regulate when, and with whom, the surrogate can engage
in sexual activity, and also contain abortion and selective fetal reduction
clauses.134 Thus, it is important that the autonomous rights of the surrogate
are “reaffirmed so as to prevent intended parents from believing that by
virtue of carrying a fetus for them, a surrogate is surrendering her
constitutional rights to make decisions about her own body.”135 Before
discussing the appropriate limitations, however, it is necessary to first
closely examine the public policy and constitutional concerns raised by these
intrusive decision-making provisions in commercial surrogacy contracts.
A. Abortion and Selection Fetal Reduction Clauses
In general, commercial surrogacy contracts contain stipulations that
either compel or restrict a surrogate to have an abortion.136 The provision
typically reads as follows:
The Surrogate agrees that she will not abort the child once
conceived except, if in the opinion of the inseminating physician,
such action is necessary for the physical health of the Surrogate or
the child has been determined by said physician to be
physiologically abnormal. In the event of either of these two (2)
contingencies, the Surrogate desires and agrees to have said
abortion.137
Controversial cases surrounding the enforcement of these abortion clauses
in commercial surrogacy agreements have garnered widespread attention in
recent years. In 2012, Crystal Kelley, a gestational surrogate for an infertile
couple, refused to terminate a fetus with severe abnormalities.138 Twentyone weeks into the pregnancy, medical tests indicated that the fetus had a
133

See Ohs, supra note 33.
Jennifer Lahl, Contract Pregnancies Exposed: Surrogacy Contracts Don’t Protect
Surrogate Mothers and Their Children, THE WITHERSPOON INST. (Nov. 1, 2017),
www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2017/11/20390; see infra Part III.A.
135
Ohs, supra note 33, at 351.
136
Carmina Y. D’Aversa, The Right of Abortion in Surrogate Motherhood Arrangements,
7 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 1, 4 (1987).
137
Id. (quoting Katie Marie Brophy, A Surrogate Mother Contract to Bear a Child, 20 J.
FAM. L. 263, 280 (1981)).
138
Elizabeth Cohen, Surrogate Offered $10,000 to Abort Baby, CNN (Mar. 6, 2013, 2:58
PM), https://www.cnn.com
/2013/03/04/health/surrogacy-kelley-legal-battle/index.html; Kevin Dolak, Surrogate Mother
Flees Halfway Across US to Save Baby From Intended Parents, ABC NEWS (Mar. 6, 2013),
abcnews.go.com/UD/surrogate-mother-flees-halfway-us=save-babyintended/story?id=18668498.
134
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cleft palate, a heart abnormality, and Down Syndrome.139 The intended
parents demanded that the child be aborted immediately.140 Although the
surrogacy contract contained a clause giving the intended parents the right
to terminate the fetus at any time if it had severe and debilitative
abnormalities, Kelley refused to have an abortion.141
Another case arose in 2016 after a surrogate, Melissa Cook, refused to
selectively reduce a high-risk triplet pregnancy.142 Because of Cook’s
advanced age, multiple embryos were transferred to increase the chances that
at least one would prove viable.143 Fearing he would not be able to afford
triplets, the intended father asked Cook to reduce the pregnancy by one fetus
and abide by their agreement’s selective reduction clause.144 Cook, however,
refused to do so, “citing her anti-abortion beliefs.”145
In 2001, Helen Beasley entered into a surrogacy agreement with
Charles Wheeler and Martha Berman.146 The contract contained numerous
clauses providing for nearly every possible contingency—including the
requirement that Beasley would have to honor the couple’s decision to have
a selective reduction in the chance of a multiple pregnancy.147 After Beasley
discovered that she was carrying twins, however, she refused to proceed with
the selective reduction.148 A battled ensued, with Wheeler and Berman
unwilling to parent the two fetuses Beasley carried.149 Because Beasley
failed to comply with the contract, she faced the possibility of becoming a
mother.150 These cases reveal important constitutional concerns surrounding
139

Cohen, supra note 138.
Id.
141
Id. The child was born with severe health issues and was later given up for adoption
to another family. Id.
142
Cook v. Harding, 190 F. Supp. 3d 921, 928–29 (C.D. Cal. 2016); see also Michelle
Goldberg, Is a Surrogate a Mother?, SLATE (Feb. 15, 2016, 5:00 PM),
www.slate.com/articles/double_x/doublex/2016/02/custody_case_over_
triplets_in_california_raises_questions_about_surrogacy.html.
143
Cook, 190 F. Supp. 3d at 928.
144
Id. at 928–29.
145
Id. The three babies were ultimately born prematurely and remained in the neonatal
intensive care unit for two months. Id. at 929. Thereafter, a hotly contested legal battle over
parentage and the constitutionality of the California Parentage Act ensued between Cook and
C.M. See supra Part I.
146
Beasley v. Wheeler, No. CGC-01-401717 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 4, 2002); Chris Taylor,
One
Baby
Too
Many,
TIME
(Aug.
19,
2011),
http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,171789,00.html; Nightline: World
News Now (ABC television broadcast Aug. 29, 2001), available at LEXIS, News Library,
ABCNEW File.
147
Taylor, supra note 146.
148
Id.
149
Id.
150
The resolution of the conflict is unknown because the court proceedings were sealed.
Helen
Beasley
v.
Charles
Wheeler
Et
Al,
PLAINSITE,
140
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commercial surrogacy arrangements.151 In each situation, the intended
parents attempted to abrogate the surrogate’s constitutional rights with the
use of contractual provisions.152
This area of contention surrounding the decision to reduce the
pregnancy of a surrogate necessarily implicates Roe v. Wade.153 In Roe, the
Supreme Court held that, prior to fetal viability, a woman has the
constitutional right to decide whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.154
Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, stated that the “right of privacy,
whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal
liberty . . . or . . . the Ninth Amendment’s reservation of rights to the people,
is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to
terminate her pregnancy.”155 The Court noted, however, that the State has a
compelling interest in potential life, which must be balanced against the
pregnant woman’s liberty rights.156
The ruling in Roe appears to be applicable to the surrogacy situation as
well. Privacy is protected in all abortion cases, up until the first trimester,
notwithstanding whether or not the woman is a surrogate. The surrogate, in
carrying the child, is the person who undergoes several aspects of pregnancy
recognized in Roe that support a woman’s constitutional right to abortion.157
This is not without acknowledging the fact that the State has a compelling
interest in protecting the desires of the intended parents, which must be
balanced against the surrogate’s privacy rights.158 Roe’s constitutional
principles provide a surrogate with the basis upon which she can claim sole
right to decide whether or not to abort the developing fetus that she is

https://www.plainsite.org/dockets/wd8kdctj/superior-court-of-california-county-of-sanfrancisco/helen-beasley-v-charles-wheeler-et-al/ (last visited Sept. 2, 2018); see ROSEMARIE
SKAINE, PATERNITY AND AMERICAN LAW 112–13 (2003).
151
It should be noted that while these cases received press attention, there are likely others
across the country that have gone unnoticed, yet dealt with similar situations.
152
See supra text accompanying notes 138–149.
153
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
154
Id. at 153–55, 164–66.
155
Id. at 153.
156
Id. at 150, 156, 162–63.
157
See id. at 153–55. The Court recognized that “specific and direct harm medically
diagnosable even in early pregnancy may be involved” and that “mental and physical health
may be taxed by child care.” Id. at 153 (referring to the distress associated with the unwanted
child). Some of these aspects of pregnancy are applicable to the interests of the surrogate,
while others are confined to “regular” pregnancy, which was the focus of Roe. With that
being said, however, the Court addressed numerous rights pertaining to motherhood that
transcend the plights of “regular” pregnancy and, ultimately, encompass surrogacy as well.
158
See Krista Sirola, Are You My Mother? Defending the Rights of Intended Parents in
Gestational Surrogacy Arrangements in Pennsylvania, 14 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L.
131, 145–46 (2006).
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carrying for another.159
In the context of abortion rights, commercial surrogacy agreements are
analogous to spousal consent requirements. In Planned Parenthood of
Central Missouri v. Danforth,160 the Supreme Court struck down a Missouri
requirement of a husband’s written consent for an abortion during the first
twelve weeks of pregnancy.161 The Court held that a “State does not have
the constitutional authority to give a third party an absolute . . . veto over”
the abortion decision.162 In assessing the constitutional validity of the
consent-clause, the Court balanced the “interest that a devoted and protective
husband has in his wife’s pregnancy and in the growth and development of
the fetus she is carrying” and the woman’s right to terminate her
pregnancy.163 The Court concluded that since the woman “is [] more directly
and immediately affected by the pregnancy . . . the balance weighs in her
favor.”164 As such, if it is unconstitutional to require a husband’s consent
before a wife terminates her pregnancy, then, analogously, the constitution
forbids the intended parents’ lack of consent as prohibitive. A woman’s right
to decide whether to continue pregnancy or to have an abortion falls within
the scope of bodily autonomy and privacy protections that Roe v. Wade made
clear forty-five years ago.165
The selective fetal reduction clauses within the surrogacy contracts
cited in the cases above clearly exemplify the unconstitutional nature of
commercial surrogacy arrangements when an intended parent attempts to
make intrusive decisions for the surrogate mother. Thus, the constitutional
implications of these provisions should favor the surrogate, and, in addition,
courts should not enforce a contractual provision requiring a surrogate to
abort a fetus against her will or prevent her from obtaining an abortion that
she has decided is in her best interest.
B. Other Areas of Intrusive Decision-Making
In addition to termination and selective fetal reduction clauses,
commercial surrogacy agreements attempt to control and restrict other areas
pertaining to the surrogate’s decision-making abilities.166 For example,
surrogacy contracts can contain clauses that regulate the surrogate’s diet,
exercise, living arrangements, when and with whom the surrogate can
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166

See id.
428 U.S. 52 (1976).
Id. at 67–68, 83–84.
Id. at 74.
Id. at 70–71.
Id. at 71.
See id. at 60–61.
See FIELD, supra note 57, at 66.
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engage in sexual activity, and even end-of-life decision making.167 Terms of
the agreement providing that the surrogate must not smoke or drink alcoholic
beverages or that the surrogate mother abstain from sex for a short period
after insemination are reasonable restrictions.168 Terms of the agreement,
however, stipulating that the surrogate mother must consume a vegan diet
and eat only organic foods or that the intended parents will control all
medical treatment decisions are not reasonable restrictions, thus violating
constitutional principles derived from Roe.169 Therefore, it is necessary to
find the extent to which these provisions can impinge the bodily integrity of
the surrogate.
There is, in fact, broad agreement “that while fetal life deserves respect,
its protection cannot take priority over the rights of the pregnant woman.”170
The protection of a surrogate’s bodily autonomy should include her right to
make medical decisions, which not only encompasses abortion, but also the
“freedom to care for one’s health and person” and the “freedom from bodily
restraint or compulsion.”171 The right to control one’s medical treatment is
highly personal.172 For example, in In re Baby Boy Doe, a pregnant woman
was informed that if she failed to have an immediate cesarean section, her
child could be born dead or with severe mental defects.173 Because of
religious beliefs, the woman refused to consent to the procedure and instead
elected to deliver naturally.174 The court confirmed her right to make such a
decision, stating, “[a]pplied in the context of compelled medical treatment
of pregnant women . . . a woman’s right to refuse invasive medical
treatment, derived from her rights to privacy, bodily integrity, and religious
liberty, is not diminished during pregnancy.”175 This ruling, again, appears
to be applicable to the surrogacy situation. There is no reason to distinguish
between mothers who give birth naturally and surrogates who carry

167

Lahl, supra note 134.
See id. (“Contracts also regulate when the surrogate can engage in sexual activity and
with whom.”).
169
See id. (“Most contracts explicitly control the surrogate’s diet, exercise, living
arrangements, travel, and activities.”).
170
Emily Jackson, Abortion, Autonomy and Prenatal Diagnosis, 9 SOC. & LEGAL STUD.
467, 467 (2000) (citing RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT
ABORTION AND EUTHANASIA (1993)).
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D’Aversa, supra note 136, at 10 (quoting Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 213 (1973)
(Douglas, J., concurring)); see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 166 (1973) (“[T]he abortion
decision in all its aspects is inherently, and primarily, a medical decision.”).
172
See In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326 (1994).
173
Id. at 327.
174
Id.
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Id. at 332; see also Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (holding
that competent, dying persons have the right to direct the removal of life-sustaining medical
treatment).
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developing infants unrelated to them—both implicate personal rights related
to autonomous decision-making.
Contractual provisions dictating the surrogate’s conduct throughout the
pregnancy create a tension between allowing the intended parents to make
decisions for the surrogate mother in the hopes of protecting their developing
fetus and ensuring that the surrogacy contract does not divest the surrogate
of all autonomous decision-making rights. By using the Roe framework, as
well as the In re Baby Boy Doe decision, there are well-established
constitutional rights that protect the surrogate mother from unfettered bodily
intrusion.176 It should of course be acknowledged that this robust
commitment to respecting a surrogate’s right to make her own decisions
extends only to constitutional rights and what she has not waived in the
surrogacy contract. Therefore, courts should not enforce contracts that
compel waiver of constitutional rights and states should legislatively impose
restrictions on which aspects of decision-making can or cannot be waived.
IV. THE CURRENT REGULATORY SCHEME AMONG THE STATES
Despite the growing prevalence and availability of commercial
surrogacy arrangements,177 the law of surrogate motherhood in the United
States is still in a state of confusion.178 Surrogacy laws are determined by
each state, and states have widely differing laws; some enforcing surrogacy
contracts, some banning them entirely, and some allowing them under
certain circumstances.179 Many states, however, do not have any laws
regarding surrogacy contracts.180 As a result, courts are often left to decide
contractual disputes when they arise, and have a range of approaches by
which to do so.181
An important starting position that states need to consider in
determining their surrogacy laws is to focus on the surrogate. This section
will examine how different states with surrogacy laws handle contracts that
include intrusive decision-making provisions that affect the bodily integrity
176

See supra text accompanying notes 153–165, 173–175.
See supra Part II.B.
178
See Gestational Surrogacy Law Across the United States: State-By-State Interactive
Map
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Surrogacy,
CREATIVE
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CONNECTIONS,
https://www.creativefamilyconnections.com/us-surrogacy-law-map/ (last visited Sept. 2,
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Id.
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Id. There are 15 states that permit surrogacy (e.g, California and Connecticut); 5 states
that prohibit surrogacy (e.g., New York and Arizona); 11 states that allow some form of
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See, e.g., Raftopol v. Ramey, 12 A.3d 783 (Conn. 2011); In re Paternity & Maternity
of Infant R., 922 N.E.2d 59 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010); St. Mary v. Damon, 309 P.3d 1027 (Nev.
2013).
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of the surrogate. It is imperative to assess the various ways in which states
address this matter of contention in order to find an appropriate solution to
ensure that the surrogacy contract does not divest the surrogate of all
autonomous, decision-making rights.
A. State Statutes Limiting Intrusive Decision-Making Provisions in
Surrogacy Arrangements
Some states have already adopted statutes that restrict the extent to
which a surrogacy contract can define the decision-making rights of a
surrogate. Maine,182 Texas,183 and Utah184 have enacted provisions that
protect the surrogate’s autonomous rights in a broad sense. They all state in
a similar manner that the surrogacy agreement cannot limit the right of the
gestational surrogate to make decisions to safeguard her health.185 The
legislatures from these states, however, failed to define what decisions fall
within the “to safeguard her health” scope.186 As a result, an argument can
be made that the scope would include the right to choose whether or not to
have an abortion or a cesarean section—but the bounds are unknown. This
ambiguity will eventually lead to disputes attempting to discern which
provisions constitute a decision to safeguard a surrogate’s health.
On the other end of the spectrum are states, such as Indiana,187
Louisiana,188 and Florida,189 which have enacted provisions that protect the
surrogate’s autonomous, decision-making rights in a narrow sense. For
example, Indiana finds it against public policy to require a surrogate to do
any of the following: “consent to undergo or undergo an abortion,” “use a
substance or engage in activity only in accordance with the demands of
another person,” or “waive parental rights or duties to a child.”190 Louisiana
and Florida have similar provisions that prohibit a surrogacy agreement from
containing termination or selective fetal reduction clauses.191 These states
182

ME. REV. STAT ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1932 (2016).
TEX. FAM. CODE § 160.754 (West 2003).
184
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-808 (West 2005).
185
§ 1932(5) (“A gestational carrier agreement may not limit the right of the gestational
carrier to make decision[s] to safeguard her health.”); § 160.754(g) (“A gestational agreement
may not limit the right of the gestational mother to make decisions to safeguard her health or
the health of an embryo.”); § 78B-15-808(2) (“A gestational agreement may not limit the right
of the gestational mother to make decisions to safeguard her health or that of the embryo or
fetus.”).
186
See supra notes 182–185 and accompanying text.
187
IND. CODE ANN. § 31-20-1-1 (West 1997).
188
LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:286(D) (2016).
189
FLA STAT. § 63.213 (2012).
190
§ 31-20-1-1.
191
§ 14:286(D)(4) (“It shall be unlawful for any person to . . . induce any gestational
carrier, whether or not she is party to an enforceable or unenforceable agreement for genetic
183
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leave a significant degree of latitude for the intended parents to control other
areas of intrusive decision-making for the surrogate mother.
In addition to imposing restrictions on specific rights that cannot be
contracted away, state legislatures should provide courts with a general
framework to determine whether to enforce contractual provisions that
impose obligations on the surrogate. But before discussing the appropriate
framework, it is important to see which autonomous rights states allow
surrogacy agreements to control.
B. State Statutes Allowing Intrusive Decision-Making Provisions in
Surrogacy Arrangements
Some states have adopted statutes that specifically define which
provisions can be contained in a surrogacy contract without hindering its
enforceability. Nevada,192 Delaware,193 and Illinois194 have enacted
legislation that allows a surrogacy agreement to waive certain decisionmaking rights of the surrogate. For example, Nevada’s surrogacy laws
provide that a surrogacy agreement will be upheld even if it contains the
following terms:
(a) The gestational carrier’s agreement to undergo all medical
examinations, treatments and fetal monitoring procedures
recommended for the success of the pregnancy by the physician
providing care to the gestational carrier during the pregnancy.
(b) The gestational carrier’s agreement to abstain from any
activities that the intended parent or parents or the physician
providing care to the gestational carrier during the pregnancy
reasonably believes to be harmful to the pregnancy and the future
health of any resulting child, including, without limitation,
smoking, drinking alcohol, using nonprescribed drugs, using
prescription drugs not authorized by a physician aware of the
pregnancy, exposure to radiation or any other activity proscribed
by a health care provider.195
Although these provisions would limit the autonomous rights of the
surrogate, they appear to be reasonable restrictions.196 The potential life
engenders some degree of social concern, and as such, some of the
surrogate’s decision-making rights will need to be subdued by the
gestational carrier or gestational carrier contract, to consent to an abortion.”); § 63.213(3)(b)
(“A preplanned adoption agreement shall not contain any provision . . . [r]equiring the
termination of the volunteer mother’s pregnancy.”).
192
NEV. REV. STAT. § 126.750 (2013).
193
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-807 (2013).
194
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/25 (2005).
195
§ 126.750(5)(a)–(b).
196
See discussion supra Part III.
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commercial surrogacy agreement between her and the intended parents.
Therefore, it is necessary to find the extent to which these provisions can
impinge the bodily integrity of the surrogate, striking a balance between
allowing the intended parents to make intrusive decisions for the surrogate
mother, and ensuring the surrogacy contract does not divest the surrogate of
all autonomous decision-making rights.
V. EVALUATING POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO ADDRESS GAPS AND
VARIATIONS
One of the main concerns pertaining to commercial surrogacy focuses
on the belief that the intended parents should not be able to use provisions in
a surrogacy contract to have an unfettered ability to control or limit the
surrogate’s behavior during the pregnancy.197 Commercial surrogacy
arrangements are anomalous in that they involve one or more persons
contracting for the provision of labor that implicates the bodily integrity of a
third party.198 As a result, the surrogate mother is unable “to exercise a
substantial amount of control over [her] performance of the contract.”199
Although there is a well-recognized legal doctrine that allows parties to
contract freely, and as such, waive some of their constitutional rights, the
nature of commercial surrogacy is more permanent and personal than a
typical contract.200 Therefore, legislation should impose restrictions on
which aspects of decision-making can or cannot be waived. As noted, in
states such as Maine, Texas, and Utah, which have adopted broad limitations,
these restrictions need to provide courts with a particularized framework to
determine whether to enforce contractual provisions that impose obligations
on the surrogate.201 In addition, as exemplified in states such as Indiana,
Louisiana, and Florida, this framework needs to take into account some
degree of social concern for the developing infant.202
The proposed solution for this matter of contention is to provide a
balancing test where courts should weigh various factors in order to
determine the enforceability of contractual provisions that divest the
surrogate of her autonomous, decision-making rights. The first factor that
courts should take into consideration is the constitutional right of privacy
and liberty expressed in cases such as Roe v. Wade.203 Due to the permanent
197

See supra Part II.C.
See Lieber, supra note 32, at 226–27.
199
Keith J. Cunningham, Surrogate Mother Contracts: Analysis of a Remedial Quagmire,
37 EMORY L. J. 721, 742 (1988).
200
See id.
201
See supra Part IV.A.
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See supra Part IV.B.
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See supra Part III.
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and intense nature of surrogacy arrangements, a surrogate mother should not
be able to waive her constitutional rights—including, but not limited to, the
right to decide whether or not to terminate her pregnancy and the right to
control her medical treatment.204 As illustrated through case law, a surrogate
mother may change her mind or disagree with the intended parents on
decisions that she failed to contemplate prior to entering into the surrogacy
agreement.205 Thus, if a surrogate mother refuses to comport with the
requests of the intended parents, courts should contemplate the constitutional
rights of the surrogate as a factor in the balancing test in order to decide
whether to enforce the particular contractual provision.
The second factor focuses on the safety concerns presented for the
surrogate compared to the safety concerns presented for the developing fetus.
Considering there are potentially higher safety concerns for the fetus
compared to that of the surrogate, contractual provisions imposing
obligations on the surrogate “to visit the doctor, to eat healthy, and to refrain
from consuming substances such as drugs, alcohol, and cigarettes that could
harm the developing fetus”206 appear to be reasonable. If the safety concerns
are comparably close, however, the court should err on the side of the
surrogate. This factor takes into account the degree of social concern for the
developing infant, but continues to place the primacy on the surrogate’s
autonomous rights.
The third factor urges the courts to examine the degree and nature of
the intrusion. If the provision bears ample impingement on the surrogate’s
bodily integrity then the court should not command its enforcement. As
noted, most commercial surrogacy contracts regulate when and with whom
the surrogate can engage in sexual activity.207 This level of intrusion on
privacy interests is justifiable for the first two weeks before and after embryo
transfer; however, after this extent of time has passed, it would no longer be
as compelling of a demand. This factor provides a safeguard to ensure that
intrusion upon the surrogate’s autonomous, decision-making rights is
minimized.
The fourth factor contemplates the burden placed upon the surrogate
mother to conform to the obligations contained in the surrogacy agreement.
Courts should find fault with provisions that are cumbersome for the
surrogate to comply with. The analysis should weigh the minimal benefit to
the fetus against the burden imposed on the surrogate. For example, terms
of an agreement stipulating that the surrogate mother must consume a vegan
diet and eat only organic food can place an objectionably high burden on the
204
205
206
207

See supra Part III.
See supra Part II.A; see also supra Part III.A.
FIELD, supra note 57, at 66; see supra Part III.B.
Lahl, supra note 134.
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surrogate, and courts should not enforce such terms.208
The last factor that courts should take into consideration is the
bargaining power of both parties at the time they entered into the agreement.
To enforce a surrogacy contract, there should be a representation of
meaningful choice and informed consent on the part of the contracting
parties. Locking a surrogate into rigid constraints entered into at the
formation of the contract is to ignore the social and psychological realities
of commercial surrogacy. Strictly applying contractual provisions can
conflict with issues of bodily integrity by attempting to confine a surrogate
who failed to receive proper counseling or full disclosure before entering
into the surrogacy agreement. This would be contrary to public policy, and
therefore, is an important factor for courts to consider.
Courts should weigh the aforementioned factors against one another to
determine the appropriate remedy if a dispute were to arise between the
intended parents and the surrogate over a provision within the surrogacy
contract. Courts should recognize that a surrogate mother is placed in a
unique situation where she is expected to submit to extremely precise,
restrictive clauses that control nearly every aspect of her personal life
without having the ability to stop performance in the middle of the
contract.209 This balancing test provides a standard that allows courts to
weigh the burdens of bodily intrusion against the benefits to the fetus.
Intended parents should not have an unfettered ability to control or limit the
surrogate’s behavior during the pregnancy by provisions in a surrogacy
contract. For example, the surrogacy agreement should not be able to force
a surrogate to have an abortion. The surrogate should retain the ability to do
so, however, if it is in the best interest of her health. Ultimately, this
framework is designed to protect a surrogate’s bodily autonomy and her
decision-making rights.
VI. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, states need to regulate surrogacy issues in order to
protect a surrogate’s bodily autonomy during her pregnancy. It is important
that the autonomous rights of the surrogate are “reaffirmed so as to prevent
intended parents from believing that by virtue of carrying a fetus for them, a
surrogate is surrendering [all of] her constitutional rights to make decisions
about her own body.”210 As an important starting position in determining
their surrogacy laws, states need to focus on the rights of the surrogate.
Legislation should impose ample restrictions on specific rights that cannot
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be contracted away, as well as provide courts with a legal framework to
determine the limitations of provisions that divest the surrogate of her
autonomous, decision-making rights.

